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Based on primary sources, this article analyzes 150 participatory events related to planned hydrocarbon
projects in Peru (2007–2012). Therein, it sheds light on state depoliticizing practices and local popula-
tions’ contestations thereof. We argue that participation in the extraction sector has not enabled effective
participation and has instead been used to pave the way for expanding the extractive frontiers. We find
that the state entity responsible for carrying out the events applied three main depoliticizing practices:
(a) the organization of exclusionary participatory processes, (b) the provision of pro-extraction informa-
tion, and (c) the identification of critical actors and discourses in order to formulate recommendations on
how to weaken resistance against the planned activities. This study also reveals that local populations
often contested the participatory events and identifies subnational patterns of local contestation. We find
that higher degrees of contestation were fueled by previous negative experiences with extraction activ-
ities and the existence of local economic alternatives. To assess the histories and results of contestation
over specific extractive activities over time, the study draws on monthly conflict reports produced by the
Peruvian ombudsperson (2007–2016). We find that local contestation was quite influential, leading to
increased social investment programs in the affected areas, the withdrawal of several extraction corpo-
rations, and Peru’s adoption of the Law on Prior Consultation (2011). However, the long-term prospects of
the transformations provoked by repoliticizing processes need to be evaluated in the years to come.
 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an openaccess article under the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Since the 1990s, different forms of participation have increas-
ingly been established in environmental governance from the local
to the global (Bäckstrand, 2006; Leifsen, Gustafsson, Guzmán-
Gallegos, & Schilling-Vacaflor, 2017). For instance, principle 10 of
the Rio Declaration from 1992, which stated that ‘‘environmental
issues are best handled with the participation of all citizens con-
cerned,” has entered a significant amount of domestic legislation.
In addition, specific participatory rights of indigenous peoples,
such as the right to prior consultation and to free, prior and
informed consent (FPIC), have been legally recognized by interna-
tional organizations and states (Rodríguez Garavito, Morris, Orduz
Salina, & Buriticá 2010). Latin America is home to most of the coun-
tries that ratified the International Labor Convention 169 on therights of indigenous peoples and has recognized the rights of
indigenous peoples to the greatest extent.
In practice, however, the great majority of Latin American states
have failed to comply with indigenous peoples’ right to prior con-
sultation and FPIC (see Flemmer, & Schilling-Vacaflor, 2016;
Leifsen et al., 2017). Instead of organizing comprehensive prior
consultation and consent processes with indigenous communities
affected by planned resource extraction, most states have merely
organized public participation events. Interestingly, the large num-
ber of such tokenistic participatory practices have rarely been cov-
ered by academics, whose work has focused on the comparatively
few prior consultation and consent processes (see Rodríguez
Garavito, 2011; Flemmer, & Schilling-Vacaflor, 2016; Faletti, &
Riofrancos, 2017; Leifsen et al., 2017; Machado, López Matta,
Campo, Escobar, & Weitzner, 2017).1 In this article we share
O’Faircheallaigh’s (2010) broad understanding of the term ‘‘public
participation,” which encompasses the full range of ways in whichublished
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planned extraction projects, spanning from lower gradations of citi-
zen participation (such as manipulation, tokenism, information, con-
sultation and placation) to more influential forms of participation
(partnership, delegated power, citizen control) (for a typology, see
Arnstein, 1969). Out of the broad range of different participatory
mechanisms, this article focuses on participatory events carried
out by the Peruvian state about new hydrocarbon projects, including
both indigenous and nonindigenous citizens and communities. To
find out more about the specific characteristics of these events –
especially about the opinions, questions, and claims brought forward
by the participants – we analyzed a rich volume of primary data on
150 participatory events. The analyzed data were produced by Peru-
petro (PP), the state entity responsible for organizing public partici-
pation in Peru’s hydrocarbon sector. To our knowledge, this paper
represents the first systematic analysis of such a large number of
participatory events.
The covered events are situated at different sites of Peru’s
hydrocarbon frontiers. As in other countries, extractive frontiers
have expanded here significantly in the past few decades, produc-
ing new and diverse places of encounters (Peluso & Lund, 2011).
The expansion of the hydrocarbon frontiers has provoked or exac-
erbated processes of contestation and conflict (see Bebbington,
Abramovay, & Chiriboga, 2008; Bebbington, 2011; Bebbington &
Bury, 2013a; De Castro, Hogenboom, & Baud, 2016).2 In this
conflict-ridden context the participatory events brought together
state and local actors, who debated the future of new extraction ini-
tiatives. The state used different practices to depoliticize the events
and to tame dissent against resource extraction. In turn, local popu-
lations often contested and thereby repoliticized the events and
planned resource extraction projects in their vicinity. Our concept
of contestation – which is in line with those of Wiener (2014) and
Engels and Dietz (2017) – refers to a social practice in which at least
two actors are involved and that encompasses claim making, the
expression of disapproval, and ‘‘objection to specific issues that mat-
ter to people” (Wiener, 2014, p. 1). The practices used to express
contestation range from subtle expressions like critique to visible
forms of protest. Against this backdrop, there are two guiding ques-
tions: How did the depoliticizing practices of the state interplay with
local populations’ contestation over controversial extractive projects
and flawed participation processes? What were the results of local
contestations, i.e. was repoliticization effective over time?
Sections two and three of this article briefly outline the meth-
ods and empirical data used and review previous literature from
political ecology and development studies on the depoliticizing
and repoliticizing effects of participation. Section four then pro-
vides information about the historical background and legal frame-
work of public participation in Peru’s hydrocarbon sector.
Section five illustrates three practices that the state used to
depoliticize the participatory events. Section six sheds light on
the different manifestations of local contestation expressed in the
events. All events were classified according to a scheme we elabo-
rated, which distinguished four degrees of local contestation
according to their intensity. Moreover, we georeferentially map
all events and briefly discuss the different degrees of local contes-
tation in subnational contexts. Section seven assesses the results of
depoliticizing and repoliticizing practices in the short run and in
the long run by reconstructing longer histories of contestation sur-2 According to the Peruvian ombudsperson, the percentage of socioenvironmental
conflicts from the total number of conflicts in Peru has exponentially increased from
31 percent in March of 2007 to 79 percent in March of 2016 (see Defensoría del
Pueblo, 2007–2016). Hence, the highly visible conflict of Bagua in 2009, which caused
the death of at least 33 people, was only the tip of an iceberg. The lack of participation
or, more specifically, the passing of dozens of governmental decrees that restricted
collective rights without the prior consultation of indigenous peoples played a major
role in this conflict (see Hughes, 2010; Acuña, 2015).rounding 13 hydrocarbon concessions. This required us to draw on
an additional database elaborated from the monthly reports on
social conflicts produced by the Peruvian ombudsperson (2007–
2016). In the final section, we reflect upon our findings and their
broader implications regarding participation and contestation over
extraction activities.2. Data collection and data analysis
This article’s findings are foremost based on the systematic
analysis of two complementary sources of data: PP reports on
150 participatory events carried out about new hydrocarbon con-
cessions in Peru (2007–2012) and monthly reports from the Peru-
vian ombudsperson on social conflicts (January 2007–June 2016)
(Defensoria del Pueblo, 2007–2016).
The 150 participatory events covered in this article concerned
72 different hydrocarbon blocks (i.e., the concessions of specific
areas for carrying out future oil and gas projects). The data about
these events comes from reports that PP sends to the Ministry of
Energy and Mines (MEM) after the conclusion of each event. The
reports are detailed and akin to internal administrative documents
given that their main objective is to inform the MEM about the
events. Once PP completes the events, the MEM is responsible for
further environmental licensing procedures. Despite Peruvian
transparency laws that oblige PP to make this information accessi-
ble, most of the reports were not published online. PP only gave us
the reports in the form of digital copies (14 CDs) after several
months of insistence. The reports cover all informative events
about new hydrocarbon concessions carried out between 2007
and 2012, except the cases along the Peruvian coast and offshore
projects.3
PP’s reports document the content of the events, information
about the participating persons and institutions, the characteristics
of the events, and information on participants’ perceptions, cri-
tiques, conclusions, and/or recommendations. Each report has an
annex that contains the following documents with varying levels
of detail: attendance lists, transcripts of the participants’ questions,
maps of the relevant hydrocarbon block, photos of the event, the
PowerPoint presentations that were shown to the participants,
written declarations or flyers from participants, and/or participant
surveys concerning hydrocarbon projects before and after the
event. Interestingly, the reports also contain detailed information
about any ‘‘extraordinary incidence,” such as the presence of
extraction-critical institutions/persons or participants who were
reluctant to sign the attendance list. PP reported all incidents
meticulously in order to inform the MEM about relevant local
actors and their stances toward hydrocarbon projects. Conse-
quently, we were able to gain detailed insights into the contested
character of these events. Hence, despite the fact that the PP
reports clearly present a biased view, they provided us with highly
relevant primary data.4 In order to systematically analyze the
events, we elaborated a scheme and then coded the text corpus
accordingly. We used ATLAS.ti software for the qualitative analysis,
Microsoft Excel for the descriptive statistics, and QGIS for the georef-
erential mapping. In the first phase, we assessed the general charac-
teristics of the participatory events. In the second phase, we focusedAccording to internal regulations, three events should be carried out in each
hydrocarbon block in order to (1) inform local populations about the initiation of the
licensing process, (2) announce the closure of the application process, and (3) present
the selected company.
4 In terms of data and privacy protection it was critical that extraction-critical
institutions and persons were often listed by name and with personal details within
PP’s reports. Due to the sensitivity of these data, we have anonymized such
information in this paper. In the following, reports will be cited by their official
numbers (see Online Appendix for an overview of all participatory events and their
official numbers).
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expressions and themes of local contestation. In the third phase, we
developed a classification of different degrees of contestation, rang-
ing from ‘‘no contestation” to ‘‘very high levels of contestation” (see
Section 6). To guarantee the reliability of the classification, we
employed three coders. Whenever a classification diverged, the case
was debated among the three authors of the article in order to find a
consensus over the most appropriate value.
In addition, we composed a second data set based on the
monthly conflict reports from the Peruvian ombudsperson
(Defensoria del Pueblo, 2007–2016), which are openly accessible
online and contain reliable and specific data about conflicts in Peru.
The reports comprise data produced by the decentralized offices of
the Peruvian ombudsperson, which are located in every depart-
ment of the country. The ombudsperson monitors latent and active
social conflicts and provides information on the involved actors,
conflict issues, and the trajectories of each case. Based on these
reports, we established a database containing information about
the involved actors, settings, themes, and processes of all
hydrocarbon-related conflicts between January 2007 and June
2016; their connections with specific hydrocarbon blocks; and
the outcomes of the conflict. We found that the conflict reports
from the Peruvian ombudsperson contained information about
contestations and conflicts related to 13 of the 72 hydrocarbon
concessions that are included in our database on participatory
events. In these 13 cases we were able to trace the results of high
degrees of local contestation during the events over time because
they turned into publicly visible social conflicts. The conflicts
assessed by the ombudsperson usually arose after the participatory
events; at the time when the corporations initiated the exploration
activities. Of the 13 cases, seven were located in the department of
Loreto; two in the department of Puno; and one each, in the
departments of Junín, Madre de Dios, Amazonas, and Ucayali. All
of these conflicts lasted several years, and some of them are still
ongoing.5 Despite substantial variation in the conflict trajectories,
both data sets revealed that previous negative experiences with
extraction and the existence of local economic alternatives were
the main drivers of local contestation and conflict. In order to follow
up on the cases and contextualize them in their regions, we comple-
mented our database with additional sources from public media and
secondary literature.3. The depoliticizing and repoliticizing role of participation
In this section we present a brief review of previous studies dis-
cussing the depoliticizing and repoliticizing role of participation as
well as the effects of repoliticizing practices. This literature was
mainly produced by scholars of political ecology and development
studies.
Academics investigating participatory processes have criticized
participation as a depoliticizing and therefore particularly power-
ful form of political control. For instance, Ferguson (1990) argues
that development policies and practices constitute an ‘‘antipolitics
machine” and that participation provides an efficient means of
greasing its wheels. Based on his field research in Lesotho, Fergu-
son characterizes an antipolitics machine as ‘‘depoliticizing every-
thing it touches, everywhere whisking political realities out of
sight, all the while performing, almost unnoticed, its own pre-5 Our database contains information about the histories of contestation surround-
ing block 64 (reports from October 2008 to June 2016); block 76 (reports from
September 2009 to June 2016); block 108 (reports from September 2014 to June
2016); block 116 (reports from March 2008 to June 2016); block 117 (reports from
March 2009 to March 2014); blocks 123 and 129 (reports from April 2012 to
December 2015); blocks 135, 137, 142, 152 (reports from June 2008 to August 2014)
and blocks 155 and 156 (July 2009 to March 2012).eminently political operation of expanding bureaucratic state
power” (Ferguson, 1990, p. XV). In the same vein, Kothari (2001)
suggests that participatory development programs draw previ-
ously marginalized individuals and groups into the development
process but do so in ways that bind them even more tightly to
the asymmetric structures of power. Thus, under the cover of
emancipatory language, marginalized populations of the Global
South would be incorporated into an unreconstructed project of
capitalist modernization (Cooke, & Kothari, 2001; Williams, 2004;
see also Fox, & Starn, 1997; Kirsch, 2007).
Similarly, postpolitics scholars have argued that superficial par-
ticipation processes are a mode of postdemocratic governance,
which ensures that the existing neoliberal politico-economic con-
figuration is not questioned (see Crouch, 2004; Swyngedouw,
2005, 2010a, 2010b). In this sense, Wilson and Swyngedouw
(2014, p. 6) contend that political contradictions are reduced to
policy problems managed by experts and legitimated through nar-
rowly defined participatory processes. Accordingly, Swyngedouw
(2010b, p. 309) criticizes the new networks of governance, includ-
ing stakeholder participation, as policy arrangements designed ‘‘to
ensure that the world as we know it stays fundamentally the
same.”
In the light of Latin America’s (neo)extractivist development
path (Bebbington & Bury, 2013a; Burchardt, & Dietz, 2014), the cri-
tique that public participation is used to depoliticize development
has been picked up by scholars of political ecology (Li, 2009;
Jaskoski, 2014; Perreault, 2015; Aguilar-Støen, & Hirsch, 2015). In
the region different forms of participation have been established
in the extraction sector, especially since the neoliberal reforms of
the 1990s.6 In most countries public participation in planned pro-
jects’ environmental impact assessments (EIA) is mandatory, and
in many cases the events are organized by the corporations them-
selves and not by the respective state, an independent body, or an
international organization. Li (2009) and Jaskoski (2014) critically
analyzed such public participation processes in Peru; Perreault,
(2015) in Bolivia; Leifsen, Sánchez-Vazquéz, and Reyes, (2017) in
Ecuador; and Aguilar-Støen and Hirsch, (2015) in Guatemala. All of
these publications are based on in-depth case studies in the respec-
tive countries’ mining sectors. Li (2009) argues that EIAs as participa-
tory processes create collaborative relationships between state
agents, corporations, NGOs, and communities, which strengthen
EIAs’ claims of accountability while circumscribing the spaces for
opposition to a proposed project. She shows that EIAs’ emphasis
on participation, combined with the use of pro-extractive discourses
and the delegitimization of critics, can in fact limit public critique
and reduce opposition to mining activity. Hence, people in commu-
nities affected by mining activities in Peru often felt that the very
processes that elicit their participation actually disempower and
exclude them. Likewise, Perreault (2015) convincingly claims that
public consultation in Bolivia operates as a mode of power. Perreault
concluded that participation has been ‘‘intended not to foster mean-
ingful participation, but rather to depoliticize extractive activities,
defuse tensions, and enroll community members in state projects
of resource extraction” (pp. 434–435). Adding to this strand of liter-
ature, Aguilar-Støen and Hirsch (2015) argue that investors only
view participation in environmental licensing processes as a prereq-
uisite that should be fulfilled as part of a set of bureaucratic proce-
dures, filling them with meanings and practices that are in their
own interests.
Local populations, including Afro- and indigenous communities,
often contested and thereby repoliticized narrow participatory6 Among these forms of participation have been public consultation processes with
the general citizenry, prior consultation, and consent processes for indigenous and
Afro-descendent communities, participatory planning exercises, and community-led
consultations (see Leifsen et al., 2017).
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development, we understand repoliticization as a process that
can help to turn participation into an effective tool for empowering
disadvantaged groups and thereby contribute to emancipatory
transformations (Cornwall, & Coelho, 2006; Hickey, & Mohan,
2004; Williams, 2004). Even quite closed and technocratic environ-
mental licensing processes can be (re)politicized if the public
becomes aware of the project and begins to mobilize against it
(Devlin, & Yap, 2008). Several case studies from Latin America’s
extractive industries provide evidence of the different forms of
contestation used by local populations and other critical actors to
challenge their exclusion from decision-making processes (Li,
2009; Jaskoski, 2014; Aguilar-Støen, & Hirsch, 2015; Walter, &
Urkidi, 2017; Leifsen et al., 2017). Thus, participatory processes
can never be predetermined and their subjects can never be com-
pletely controlled (Williams, 2004; Cornwall, & Coelho, 2006).
There is little research on the effects of contestation in the
extraction sector, and the existing literature has come to divergent
conclusions: some authors highlight the considerable influence
local contestation has on public policy and corporate activities,
while others are rather pessimistic. Making a more optimistic
claim, O’Faircheallaigh (2014) refers to the case of the Mirrar Abo-
riginal people of Australia’s Northern Territory to contend that eco-
nomically marginalized groups – outside of institutionalized
procedures – can use ‘‘their control over an important infrastruc-
ture corridor to force changes to project design” (pp. 160–161)
and that ‘‘coercion, in the sense of a capacity to threaten key mate-
rial interests of states and corporations, can be a significant part in
the armoury of Indigenous groups” (ibid.: p. 163). Likewise,
Jaskoski (2014) found that limited spaces for community participa-
tion in environmental licensing processes have actually prompted
popular mobilization in extractive zones, leading to the stalling of
major projects. In contrast, Devlin and Yap (2008) relativize the
success of local opposition to stop undesired projects and argued
that such cases would represent ‘‘rare examples” or ‘‘major anoma-
lies.” This assumption, however, remains to be investigated in
greater detail. Moreover, it is still unclear whether resistance
against planned projects can be upheld over a longer time period
(Bebbington, Bury, & Gallagher, 2013) and if induced institutional
changes translate into substantial outcomes (Peralta, Bebbington,
Hollenstein, Nussbaum, & Ramírez, 2015).7 The state only organized informative events and public audiences about
hydrocarbon projects until the new Law on Prior Consultation was adopted.
According to international norms, prior consultation should (a) be carried out in
good faith, (b) be prior to the planned measure, (c) be done with the representative
authorities and institutions of local communities, (d) be based on complete and
nonbiased information, (e) be culturally appropriate, and (f) seek the consent or an
agreement with the consultation participants (see Rodríguez Garavito et al., 2010).
8 PP was created in 1993 by Law No. 26221 (Organic Law for Hydrocarbons), which
determined that the state transfers the property of extracted hydrocarbons (in situ
hydrocarbons remain government property) to this company.
9 Scholars, activists, and the ILO repeatedly criticized the MEM for violating
indigenous peoples’ right to prior consultation. Finally, the Peruvian Constitutional
Court obliged the Ministry of Energy and Mines in 2010 to elaborate a proper norm on
prior consultation (No. 05427-2009-PC/TC). In 2013 the Peruvian Supreme Court
explicitly declared parts of the Supreme Decree from 2008 (012-2008) to be
unconstitutional (A.P. N 2232-2012). These court decisions granted additional power
and legitimacy to Peru’s civil society actors’ demands to adopt a specific law on the
right to prior consultation (see Schilling-Vacaflor, & Flemmer 2015).4. Public participation in peru’s hydrocarbon sector
The participatory events analyzed in this article took place at
different sites of Peru’s hydrocarbon frontiers. Most events were
carried out in Peru’s Amazonian rainforest, an area that has been
hit particularly hard by the massive expansion of the extractive
frontiers in the twenty-first century (De Castro et al., 2016). Histor-
ically, frontier expansion in the Amazon is not a new phenomenon
(Little, 2001). Waves of frontiers spanning centuries, many tied to
‘‘cyclical booms in different commodities” (Hennessy, 1978, p. 12),
generated a long-term globalization process in this area. However,
the expansion of extractive frontiers has recently been accelerating
at an unprecedented rate. In 2003 only 7.1 percent of Peru’s Ama-
zon was covered by oil and gas concessions; now, over two-thirds
of this area is zoned for hydrocarbon activities (Bebbington & Bury,
2013b, p. 16). Most of these activities affect one or more commu-
nities of the 60 different indigenous peoples inhabiting the Peru-
vian rainforest. However, the hydrocarbon frontiers have also
expanded in the highlands and the Andean foothills, zones that
are usually inhabited by peasant communities and that had previ-
ously been mainly affected by mining activities (Li, 2015).
Public participation was legally introduced into Peru’s extrac-
tive industries sector as part of the environmental reforms in the1990s. International pressure – especially from the World Bank,
which promoted the participatory principle of the Rio Declaration
– led to these reforms in state administration, which were
designed to accompany the privatization policies carried out under
Fujimori’s government (Orihuela, 2014). Today, the relevant legal
framework is General Environmental Law No. 28611 (2005);
though each sector also has its own regulations concerning partic-
ipation in environmental licensing processes. The events analyzed
in this article were first regulated by Supreme Decree 015-2006-
EM and since 2008 by Supreme Decree 012-2008. These participa-
tory events concerned mainly indigenous communities but were
open to all persons affected by the projects (i.e., populations living
in towns and settler communities). The events were part of public
participation mechanisms and did not comply with the require-
ments of the indigenous peoples’ right to prior consultation or
FPIC.7
The analyzed participatory events were carried out by PP,8
which is subordinate to the powerful Ministry of Energy and Mines
(MEM). By law, PP has the ‘‘social objective” to promote investment
in the exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons (Law No. 26221,
Article 6, a). This means that PP has a clear interest in advancing new
hydrocarbon projects and is part of the sectoral administration that
has long tried to oppose participatory mechanisms. The pro-
extraction agenda of PP has been harshly criticized by human rights
and environmental organizations.9 The participatory events covered
here were conducted between 2007 and 2012 and took place in
cities and local communities. Approximately 200–500 people partic-
ipated in cities, and about 50–200 in local indigenous or peasant
communities. On average, each event lasted about six hours, ranging
from three hours to two days in exceptional cases. From 2007 to
2012, PP organized 10–40 participatory events each year. Thereafter,
no further participatory processes were carried out until the imple-
mentation of prior consultation processes according to new Peruvian
legislation which came into effect in 2012/2013.
The participants comprised members from indigenous organi-
zations and communities as well as representatives from local gov-
ernment, regional government, and civil society organizations (e.g.,
producers’ associations and the church). Participants were invited
to the events via letters, posters, and radio and/or newspaper
announcements, sometimes in coordination with regional govern-
ments or indigenous federations. PP led the events, but other state
institutions were also occasionally present, such as the National
Institute for the Development of Andean, Amazonian and Afro
Peruvian Peoples (INDEPA), the national authorities for environ-
mental affairs, the National Service for Protected Areas (SERNANP),
and the Peruvian ombudsperson. In some cases the audience was
asked to vote whether they needed a translator. If required, a
translator was recruited from among the participants on an ad
hoc basis.
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tions and corporations presented themselves and their work, often
with the use of PowerPoint presentations. They also provided brief
information about the legal framework regulating participation
and extractive industries and about the planned hydrocarbon
activities. At the end of an event, questions were taken by staff
from the public institutions or the company. No specific agree-
ments between PP and the participants were signed as a result of
these processes. The participants were only asked to sign the atten-
dance lists and in situ protocols.5. Taming dissent: state depoliticizing practices
In this section we will outline PP practices for depoliticizing
participatory events and taming dissent against extraction activi-
ties. Formally, the purpose of the participatory events was to pro-
vide local populations with information about planned
hydrocarbon projects. However, the analyzed reports make it clear
that the events also pursued other aims – namely, to prepare the
path for expanding the extractive frontiers in Peru. In this sense,
PP states in its reports that the informative events help ‘‘to
strengthen the relationship between the corporation, the state
and civil society and to minimize the fears and preoccupations of
the affected populations concerning planned hydrocarbon pro-
jects” (see, for instance, GFPR-0195-2007).
Based on our analysis of PP’s reports, we identified three main
depoliticizing practices: (a) organizing exclusionary participatory
processes, (b) providing pro-extraction information, and (c) identi-
fying critical actors and discourses in order to formulate recom-
mendations on how to weaken resistance against planned
extraction activities.5.1. Exclusionary participatory processes
The organized participatory events were exclusionary in two
respects. First, it was not possible for all interested citizens to par-
ticipate in the events – particularly when the events took place in
cities far from the affected communities and transport was only
provided to a limited number of people. Second, we found evidence
in several PP reports that the concrete locations for carrying out
the participatory events were selected according to the state
entity’s aim of excluding critical voices. When PP received indica-
tions that local actors had very critical attitudes and were likely
to openly challenge the planned event, the state entity suspended,
postponed, or changed the location of the event. For example, a
participatory event that was supposed to be carried out with a
native community in Loreto was suspended because of the ‘‘hesi-
tant, hostile and martial” attitude of some of their leaders (GFPC-
0290-2010). Another planned event in Loreto was postponed for
one day at short notice because PP was informed that an indige-
nous organization planned to blockade the development of the
event (GFPC-0622-2009).
These incidents show that PP pursued a strategy of excluding
critical actors rather than trying to create an arena of exchange
and open-ended negotiations aiming to achieve consent. Here,
we can draw a parallel to Aldrich’s (2008) research into facility
siting in France and Japan. He finds that locations where resis-
tance is expected to be low are selected as sites for large-scale
projects (such as airports and nuclear power plants). In the case
of hydrocarbon projects, although the siting of the extraction
projects cannot be freely determined, the siting of the respective
participatory events and the inclusion or exclusion of actors can
be handled with a certain flexibility. In the analyzed Peruvian
cases, the siting of the events was used strategically to exclude
critical voices.5.2. The provision of pro-extraction information
The information provided by PP reflected its pro-extraction
agenda, as it highlighted the opportunities related to planned
extraction projects while downplaying expected negative impacts.
Their answers to questions and critique remained vague and gen-
eral. PP presented hydrocarbon activities as an opportunity for
the local populations to gain access to basic services provided by
the future company, such as schools, health care centers or electri-
fication. The most important development promise, however, was
the provision of jobs for local actors, given the generally high rates
of unemployment in the Amazonian and rural Andean communi-
ties (INEI, 2015). At the same time, the adverse socioenvironmental
impacts of hydrocarbon projects were neglected. For example, one
PP report stated that ‘‘[the extraction corporation] presented its
work plan. The corporation emphasized that the planned activities
will not cause any environmental or social damage” (PRRC-041-
2010). Another illustrative example in this regard is PP’s question-
able comparison of hydrocarbon projects with hunting activities,
which was presented at several participatory events. With the help
of pictures, PP compared the search for oil and gas to a hunter who
looks for prey, thereby naturalizing and trivializing extraction
activities. The final slide reads, ‘‘Animals give us their flesh, their
bones, their skin, their fat, their teeth. Hydrocarbons give us fuel,
heating, paint, plastic, medicines and oil” (PPPC-0323-2007).
When confronted with critical questions about the possible
negative environmental impacts of oil and gas extraction, PP or
the interested corporation responded with superficial technical
or legal answers, trying to convince participants that such fears
would have no foundation. PP presented contamination as some-
thing that only happened in the past and explained that today’s
environmental impact assessments (EIAs), existing environmental
legislation, and new technology would prevent any negative
impacts. In this regard, we share Aguilar-Støen’s and Hirsch’s,
(2015) observation that such framing political questions concern-
ing ecological impacts as technical/legal problems has strong
depoliticizing consequences.5.3. Identifying and weakening critical actors and discourses
As mentioned above, PP’s reports contained detailed informa-
tion about critical actors, discourses, and evidence of contestation
expressed during the participatory events. Among the critical
actors listed were indigenous leaders and federations, peasant
organizations, local communities and specific community mem-
bers, NGOs, members of local churches, representatives of subna-
tional governments, teachers, and entrepreneurs. In the reports
critics were represented as sharing wrong or tendentious opinions
about extraction activities. Vocal members of local populations
were presented as having been manipulated by outsiders. In turn,
PP’s own position was implicitly or explicitly portrayed as correct
and neutral. This finding resonates with Li’s (2009) insight into
Peru’s mining sector on how criticism expressed by peasants and
NGOs has often been declassified in participatory events as unin-
formed, biased, and inaccurate.
The identification of critical voices was often connected to
specific recommendations on how to handle them. For example,
in one report PP recommended establishing strategies to commu-
nicate directly with indigenous populations ‘‘to countervail the
tendentious [extraction-critical] opinions from some NGOs”
(PPPC-0787-2007). In response to strong opposition against extrac-
tion projects expressed during a participatory event in Junín, PP
suggested establishing a strategy for identifying which local actors
could help to build a ‘‘convenient dialogue for strengthening PP’s
work and to make the hydrocarbon activities in the region viable”
Table 1
Overview of the definition of the four degrees of intensity of local contestation.
Degree of contestation Description Number of Events
0 (green dots) ‘‘No contestation”: pro-extraction attitude of participants or absence of critique; in many of these cases the
participants’ expectations of benefits prevailed
43
0.33 (yellow dots) ‘‘Low degree of contestation”: informative questions, expression of concerns, a few critical questions or comments 40
0.67 (orange dots) ‘‘High degree of contestation”: expression of opposition against extractive activities by part of the participants
(divided opposition); more than 10 participants refused to sign attendance lists; massive substantial critique of
participatory process, energy politics, and/or hydrocarbon activities
52
1 (red dots) ‘‘Very high degree of contestation”: united opposition against extraction activities, mobilization, blockade of
participatory events
14
Total: 149 (+1)a
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
a The degree of contestation of one event is unknown because the report of this case is missing (ID 143 in the Online Appendix).
10 In 1988, President Alan García Pérez introduced a new administrative order in
Peru. His original plan was to establish a few regions that would superpose the 24
departments that exist since the country’s independence. This project has never been
fully implemented, and since 2002, 24 regions exist, which are identical with the
departments in their territorial boundaries, but not in their administrative
competences.
11 In the map below (Map 1), one case is marked with gray, which means that the PP
report about this case was not detailed enough to enable us to classify the respective
level of contestation. The Online Appendix contains an explanation of the classifi-
cation of each case according to the general scheme.
12 One of the cases could not be evaluated, because of a missing report.
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carried out in Puno, PP concluded that the opposition to the hydro-
carbon projects was due to these populations’ negative previous
experiences with mining activities. Hence, PP proposed organizing
additional events to ‘‘gain the trust of the population in order to
make them accept the development of hydrocarbon activities in
their territories and to dissipate the doubts about a possible con-
tamination of their water and soil” (GFPC-0328-2008).
6. Mapping local contestation
In this section we illustrate the ways participants contested and
thereby repoliticized the biased, pro-extraction participatory
events. In doing so, we also offer an insight intomain themes of local
contestation reflected in participants’ questions and claims. We
applied afine-grained scheme for assessingdifferentdegrees of local
contestation, ranging from publicly visible performances of protest
to subtle expressions of contestation (e.g., the expression of distrust
and asking critical questions), which are usually overlooked by both
the general public and in academia (see Scott, 2008).
Although we collected a considerable amount of evidence of
diverse local contestation, we have good reason to assume that
the actual degree of resistance against hydrocarbon projects in
Peru is even higher. Local populations may have been reluctant
to express their critique openly within formal, manipulative,
state-led participatory events. An enlightening observation in this
regard is that of Scott (2008, p. 324), who claims that ‘‘No matter
how conscious members of a subordinate class may be of having
gotten a raw deal, the daily pressures of making a living and the
risks of open defiance are usually enough to skew the ethnographic
record systemically in the direction of compliance, if not accep-
tance, of the inevitable.” In addition, many critical local voices were
excluded from the events beforehand by PP’s selective invitations
or due to the siting of events.
In the following we will provide an overview of the identified
degrees of local contestation, localize the participatory events on
a georeferential map, and briefly contextualize subnational pat-
terns of contestation.
6.1. Degrees of local contestation expressed in participatory events
We systematically assessed local contestation expressed in the
participatory events and elaborated a classificatory scheme that
distinguishes between four degrees of intensity. Table 1 gives an
overview of the definition of each level of contestation. In addition,
a detailed account explaining the classification of each case and
illustrating the expressions and specific themes of local contesta-
tion can be found in the Online Appendix.
In order to visualize the differing degrees of local contestation
and their geographical distribution, we created a georeferentialmap locating the participatory events (see below). The map shows
all of Peru’s 24 departments and its river system,10 which is of
importance in terms of mobility in the Amazon. The hydrocarbon
blocks are drawn in the map as rectangles in different shades of
brown, which are marked with the identification number PP uses
for each block. The blocks with red boundaries in Fig. 1 below are
the 13 oil blocks that were selected from the Ombudsperson reports
about socioenvironmental conflicts in Peru. We divided the map into
five geographical zones (I-V), which reflect specific subnational pat-
terns (see Section 6.2). The dots in the map represent all 150 events
analyzed and the different colors indicate their respective degrees of
contestation. A score of 0 (green in the map below) means ‘‘no local
contestation” – that is, data from the reports did not indicate any
kind of critique during the event. In some cases, participants in this
category even expressed positive opinions concerning the participa-
tory process or planned hydrocarbon projects. The score 0.33 (yellow
in the map below) indicates ‘‘low local contestation.” Here, reports
revealed the existence of ‘‘soft” critiques such as verbal articulations
of distrust toward the distributed information or a few critical ques-
tions or comments. A score of 0.67 (orange in the map below) indi-
cates ‘‘high local contestation.” We assigned this category whenever
critiques and/or strong threat perceptions were clearly expressed
during the participatory event, when a group of participants
expressed their explicit opposition to extraction activities, or when
more than 10 participants (which is unlikely to happen coinciden-
tally) refused to sign the attendance list. The refusal to sign these
lists was usually either a form of protest and/or due to participants’
fears that PP could present the lists as evidence of local approval of
extraction projects. A score of 1 (red in the map below) indicates
‘‘very high local contestation.” In such instances event participants
either organized protests or expressed their united opposition
against hydrocarbon activities.11
Of the 150 events, 43 were characterized by no local contesta-
tion; 40, by a low degree of local contestation; 52, by a high degree
of local contestation; and 14, by a very high degree of local
contestation.12
The participants of the analyzed events chose different ways in
which to challenge the participatory events about planned hydro-
carbon activities. These included the most frequent type of contes-
tation, the formulation of critical questions or comments, which
Fig. 1. Overview of the hydrocarbon blocks and the analyzed participatory events according to their degree of local contestation. Source: Authors’ own elaboration, based on
data from Perupetro and the administrative boundaries from GADM (http://gadm.org/).
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ences with extraction activities or their knowledge thereof. In nine
cases participants handed written statements over to PP in which
they outlined their critical opinion concerning the participatory
events and/or the planned hydrocarbon activities. For example, in
an event in Puno, a peasant federation handed in a declaration that
stated that the local peasants were only willing to participate in
decisions via their right to FPIC and to reject hydrocarbon projects
in order to protect agriculture in their territories (GFPC-0328-
2008). According to our information, participants refused to sign
the attendance list in 22 cases; this included 18 events wherein
10 or more participants opposed to sign this list. In another 22
cases, participants orally expressed their outright rejection of any
extraction activity within their territories, while in seven cases
participants organized protest activities or blockaded the event.
The later cases indicate degrees of ‘‘very high local contestation”(red dots) and include, for example, an event in Puno where two
hundred people chased off PP staff (GFPC-097-2010) and an event
in San Martín where over 500 people protested against hydrocar-
bon projects in the area (GFPC-0239-2010).
6.2. Subnational patterns of contestation
Our analysis revealed that the four most frequent issues
addressed within manifestations of local contestation were (a)
the general distrust of participants toward the Peruvian state
and/or extraction corporations, (b) previous negative experiences
of local populations with hydrocarbon or similar industries, (c)
fears concerning contamination, especially with regard to the
quantity and quality of water sources, and (d) fears that extraction
activities would put their local economies at risk. Another reason
for critique was the insufficient quality of information provided
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unequal distribution of revenues from the hydrocarbon sector
and called for more local benefits. However, we also found that
subnational differences exist, both with regard to the degrees
and specific issues of local contestation.
The georeferential map enabled us to effectively visualize ‘‘hot
spots” of local contestation. We found that most contested areas
lie in the northern foothills, the Andean region of Puno, and in
the rainforest department of Madre de Dios. In contrast, participa-
tory events in the northern Amazon were very diverse in the
degrees of contestation and in the central Amazon events were,
with three exceptions, characterized by low or no local contesta-
tion. Our analysis reveals that local contestation depended on par-
ticipants’ prior experiences and expectations, which are rooted in
the history of each locality. In order to understand the subnational
patterns of contestation, we will briefly contextualize them.
The northern Amazon (‘‘Zone I” in the Fig. 1 above, major part of
Loreto department) is characterized by a mixture of high degrees of
contestation and no contestation – with very high and low levels
being the exception. Some ‘‘hot spots” of hydrocarbon conflicts
are located in this zone (see Section 7). Main issues of local contes-
tation in this area were negative previous experiences with oil con-
tamination as well as the noncompliance of companies and the
state with agreements. The critical local positions towards
resource extraction can be understood in the light of the
decades-old and ongoing contamination caused by Peru’s oldest
oil block and the related struggles for the remediation of environ-
mental damages (formerly block 1AB/today 192) (see Bebbington
& Scurrah, 2013, p. 177; Orta-Martínez et al., 2007). New hydrocar-
bon projects located in remote areas in the northern Amazon were
less or not contested.
In the northern foothills (‘‘Zone II”, departments of Amazonas
and San Martín and the northwestern part of Loreto department)
very high and high degrees of contestation were present, which
were fueled by the Bagua conflicts – a violent high point of the con-
flicts in the area. For example, in a participatory event in 2010 the
participants made it clear that they were not willing to talk with
the government about extraction activities until the indigenous
leaders who had been arrested during the conflict were freed
(GFPC-0282-2010). In addition, the presence of mining and hydro-
carbon concessions and local knowledge about the negative
impacts of these industries, both in Loreto and neighboring Caja-
marca, have led to extraction-critical alliances between indigenous
and peasant organizations (see Greene, 2006; Chirif, 2013). Locals
in San Martín department, in particular, have articulated environ-
mental concerns (see GFPC-0239-2010). This department is known
as a ‘‘green region” with a strong political focus on natural conser-
vation (Kowler et al., 2016, p. 40). San Martín was the first in Peru
to propose REDD+ initiatives, and its inhabitants have repeatedly
mobilized against extractive industries and the expansion of the
agricultural frontiers, especially against palm oil plantations.
In the central Amazon (‘‘Zone III”, Ucayali department, the
southeastern part of Loreto department, and the eastern parts of
Huánuco and Junín departments), participatory events showed
no contestation or low degrees of local contestation.13 The events
in this area were generally characterized by high expectations con-
cerning economic improvements and employment opportunities.
At the same time, the perception of threat of environmental contam-13 The exceptional case of a ‘‘very high degree of contestation” located in the central
Amazonian has been the outright rejection articulated by the local Asháninka
organization against external interventions such as oil activities in hydrocarbon block
108 in the department of Junín (Map 1). The reason for this opposition is closely
related to the ‘‘traumatic experiences of violence” the Asháninka suffered during the
internal conflict between the state government and the leftist guerrilla Sendero
Luminoso in the 1980s and 1990s (CVR, 2003).ination expressed by participants in this area was rather vague. This
finding can be largely explained by the absence of both severe neg-
ative experiences with similar industries and of strong and critical
local organizations capable of articulating community grievances.
This finding confirms Devlin and Yap’s (2008) argument that it will
be difficult to mobilize public opposition to a project that is largely
conceived as being necessary for creating jobs, despite concerns that
it might have significant negative environmental impacts.
In the southern Amazon (‘‘Zone IV”, Madre de Dios department
and northeastern part of Puno department) the very high and high
degrees of local contestation resulted from participants’ negative
view of hydrocarbon projects, which is rooted in their conflict-
riddled history with extraction and infrastructure (La Torre
López, 1998; Haselip, & Romera, 2011). The area is one of the most
biodiverse hotspots on earth, which is under growing threat from
lumbering, (mainly illegal) gold mining, and the Southern Intero-
ceanic Highway, which connects Peru to Brazil and Bolivia. Hydro-
carbon projects are placing additional pressure on this part of the
rainforest, which is an important transit area for highly vulnerable
populations living in voluntary isolation (Huertas Castillo, 2004;
Orta-Martínez, & Finer, 2010). Hydrocarbon block 76, which was
established in 2007 without prior consultation, overlaps the Amar-
akaeri Communal Reserve (ACR). This has caused discontent
because the ACR had been recognized only a few years earlier in
2002, when it was celebrated as ‘‘a great victory for indigenous
people” (Alvarez et al., 2008, p. 112).
In the southern highlands (‘‘Zone V”, major part of Puno depart-
ment) participatory events were characterized by high or very high
levels of contestation. According to our analysis, the strong resis-
tance to hydrocarbon projects in this area is down to the interac-
tion between (a) previous negative experiences with mining
activities, (b) the strongly perceived threat to local economic activ-
ities, and (c) the tense and conflict-prone relationships between
subnational governments and the central state.14 Opposition to
extractive industries has taken the form of several protests and
strikes supported by subnational governments in the past few years.
Moreover, local opposition to resource extraction has also been sup-
ported by powerful local entrepreneurs (see Bebbington et al., 2013,
p. 279). Interestingly, the claims voiced by many of the participants
in PP events in Puno did not just target single extraction projects but
also comprised broader and more fundamental demands, such as the
nationalization of extractive industries and the organization of a
constituent assembly (GFPC-0631-2008).
In summary, depoliticizing practices were unsuccessful when
local populations had already developed a clear negative position
toward extraction projects and had formed broader extraction-
critical local alliances. This stance could be due to previous
negative experiences related to hydrocarbon projects or negative
experiences with similar industries, like mining and logging.
Furthermore, general distrust or negative attitudes toward the state
or extraction corporations – fostered by, for example, corruption
scandals, flawed EIAs, or inefficient forms of revenue distribution
– have driven local contestation. This finding supports the claim
that socioecological conflicts are ‘‘multilayered” (Beckert,
Dittrich, & Adiwibowo, 2014; see also Bebbington & Bury, 2013b,
19). In this regard and based on the present study, we call upon
policymakers and academics alike to pay more attention to the
interaction between mining and hydrocarbon conflicts, which have
been potentiating each other. High levels of local contestation also
correlated with the existence of well-developed local economies,
such as those in the northern foothills and in Puno. In these cases14 Interestingly, we found that local contestation was particularly severe before
subnational elections. It seems that candidates for subnational government positions
used the expression of opposition within participatory events to gain popularity
among local voters (see GFPC-097-2010).
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zones characterized by a lack of economic alternatives.7. The effect of depoliticization and local contestation
In many PP reports we found evidence of the short-term effec-
tiveness of its pro-extraction strategies. Before and after 26 events,
PP conducted surveys with participants on their attitudes toward
hydrocarbon projects. While these surveys often included samples
of only 10–20 people, they all indicated that after participatory
events respondents’ opinions were more favorable toward hydro-
carbon activities than before. Several reports also contained illus-
trations of the effectiveness of PP’s pro-extraction agenda. For
example, a PP report on a participatory event in Loreto stated that
‘‘the participants from the native community [. . .] initially mani-
fested their position against the presence of oil companies in the
area due to fears of contamination. This position was minimized
towards the end of the event” (GFPC-0273-2010). Another report
documented that before a participatory event in San Martín, ‘‘a
pacific [antiextraction] March through the city was scheduled. This
March was suspended because many of its promoters participated
in the lunch prepared by PP. During the lunch, the critical state-
ments were attenuated” (GFPC-0239-2010). When only looking
at such evidence of the depoliticizing effects of these manipulative
informative events, we could conclude that PP practices were very
successful. However, this conclusion has to be relativized by taking
into account local populations’ contestations against extraction
activities, which they expressed during and after participatory
events.
To assess the effect of local contestation against hydrocarbon
activities over time, we compiled a database of monthly reports
on social conflicts drafted by the Peruvian ombudsperson (2007–
2016). As outlined above, we used this database to trace concrete
histories of contestation surrounding the 13 most controversial
hydrocarbon blocks as indicated by the monthly reports (blocks
64, 76, 108, 116, 117, 123, 129, 135, 137, 142, 152, 155, 156; see
blocks marked with red boundaries in Fig. 1) and to review their
results.15 National and international media covered that oil companies are leaving Peru due
to social conflicts (Hill, 2017; Saldarriaga, 2014, 2017).7.1. Beyond participatory events: histories of contestation
The Peruvian ombudsperson’s reports evince the complex char-
acter of the histories of contestation, which were characterized by
the involvement of diverse actors. In most cases several state min-
istries and even the presidency of the Council of Ministers (PCM) as
well as the Peruvian Congress became involved. The Peruvian
ombudsperson always played an important role in the conflicts,
either as a mediator or as an observer to guarantee local popula-
tions’ rights. In many instances indigenous peoples’ organizations,
agricultural and peasant associations, and environmental groups
created antiextraction alliances to voice their opposition to the
planned projects.
In turn, state institutions joined forces with private companies.
Interested corporations commonly engaged in actions designed to
convince local populations to let them enter their territories – for
example, by financing social projects, building infrastructure, and
engaging in direct negotiations with specific local communities
or leaders (blocks 64, 76, 116, 123, 129, 135, 137, 142, 152). Like-
wise, in several cases (blocks 108, 135, 137, 142, 152) the central
state organized working groups composed of state and civil society
representatives to discuss the local development of the zones
(health, education, etc.) and, within this framework, hydrocarbon
activities. The state and corporations thereby established a direct
link between extraction activities and the provision of basic needs
for local communities. All of these corporation-led and state-ledactivities were initiated after protests. In many cases the offer of
benefits to local populations (often offered to certain groups with
pro-extraction attitudes) exacerbated local conflicts and created
divisions across local communities and within indigenous organi-
zations (blocks 64, 108, 116). Such divide-and-rule tactics are quite
common within the extraction sector in Peru and in neighboring
countries (Sawyer, 2004; Schilling-Vacaflor, & Eichler, 2017).
Local populations affected by hydrocarbon activities employed
a wide range of activities to voice their resistance, often joining
forces with environmental groups and local governments. These
activities consisted of distributing public statements, organizing
strikes, boycotting state-led or corporation-led events, filing law-
suits, organizing community-led self-consultations against hydro-
carbon activities, and collecting thousands of signatures. Social
conflicts also resulted in collective actions like the organization
of antiextraction conferences and assemblies, street and river
blockades, and protests. In some instances, these conflicts even
escalated into violence. Protesters also sought allies outside of Peru
to pressure the state and the private companies. For example,
indigenous representatives from block 116 met with the French
minister of External Affairs in 2013 to express their concerns about
the planned projects, while indigenous leaders from blocks 64 and
76 met with shareholders from the interested oil corporations. In
addition, people affected in blocks 64 and 116 participated in hear-
ings of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR)
in October 2014 and April 2015, respectively.
Indigenous peoples’ right to prior consultation and FPIC was a
prominent claim of protestors, and noncompliance with that right
has been central to political and legal demands to annul contracts
(blocks 64, 108, 116, 117, 135, 137, 142, 152, 155, 156). Neverthe-
less, state ministries usually responded negatively to such claims,
arguing that the law of prior consultation could not be retroac-
tively applied (despite the fact that ILO C169 has been legally bind-
ing for Peru since 1995). However, a recent court decision has
challenged this narrow interpretation of the right to prior consul-
tation and FPIC and offers greater legal recourse to claimants (see
below).7.2. The results of local contestation
Two frequent consequences of contesting new hydrocarbon
projects have been the negotiation of state- and corporation-
sponsored development projects in favor of affected local popula-
tions, on the one hand, and the suspension of exploration and
extraction activities, on the other. According to public media, the
great majority of paralyzed hydrocarbon blocks in Peru were the
result of social conflicts.15 However, making clear assumptions
about the causality between social conflicts and the renouncement
of oil contracts can be tricky because corporations often refer to eco-
nomic calculations as the main reason for pulling out of contested
hydrocarbon blocks.
However, our reconstruction of the detailed contentious pro-
cesses (based mainly on the Peruvian ombudsperson’s reports)
allows us to make well-informed assumptions about some of the
direct results of contestation in Peruvian energy politics. Our data
suggest that the halting of extraction projects due to local resis-
tance is more frequent than previous studies, like that of Devlin
and Yap (2008), assumed. For instance, only two months after
indigenous leaders in block 76 informed Hunt Oil that the existing
conventions would no longer be valid, the corporation decided to
give up its plans to carry out exploration activities in the near
future and finally abandoned the concession less than two years
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out in April 2013 after a fierce year-long struggle with the local
population. The operating oil corporation in blocks 123 and 129
in the department of Loreto returned its concessions to the Peru-
vian state in October 2012 after a wave of social protests from
May to August 2012. Finally, all hydrocarbon blocks in the highly
conflictive department of Puno have either been returned to the
central state or projects have been postponed due to social
conflicts.
Effectively combining political and legal strategies, the Awajún
and Wampis peoples recently won a lawsuit in which they
demanded the right to consultation and FPIC in relation to block
116. This block had already been in place since 2006 and had a long
history of contestation. After filing their case in 2014 in the IACHR
(session on March 17, 2017) for the second time, Peru’s Supreme
Court of Justice ruled on March 28, 2017 that, due to the violation
of the indigenous right to consultation and consent, the contract to
explore for and exploit hydrocarbons in block 116 be annulled and
all related activities be suspended. The court’s ruling was cele-
brated by indigenous organizations and their allies as a precedent
for future rulings in favor of communities opposed to existing con-
cessions in Peru (SERVINDI, 2017).
The analysis of the local populations’ critical discourses – both
in the framework of the analyzed informative events and in the
broader processes – reveal the high level of politicization of many
involved groups and their allies. Very often, antiextraction cam-
paigners formulated fundamental critiques of the state’s current
energy politics (the lack of supervision of environmental impacts,
the privatized character of the oil economy, ineffective environ-
mental licensing processes, etc.). In addition, Peru’s dominant
extraction-based development path has been challenged by many
local actors, who have struggled to secure alternative futures in
which local agriculture, water resources, and indigenous reserves
are safeguarded against the negative impacts of resource
extraction.
The Law on the Right to Prior Consultation, a long standing
demand from indigenous and peasant communities affected by
resource extraction from Peru, was also adopted in response to
massive mobilizations and several lawsuits (Schilling-Vacaflor, &
Flemmer, 2015).
8. Discussion and conclusion: depoliticization and
repoliticization at extractive frontiers
The Peruvian state entity PP systematically used participatory
events to pave the way to expand the country’s extractive frontiers.
We showed that these events had a sales-like character, wherein
hopes were raised, fears were downplayed, and questions and cri-
tique were evaded. In addition, the state entity used these arenas
to identify extraction-critical forces and develop strategies to
debilitate them. Our findings are in line with those from several
case studies that revealed similar government and corporation
strategies in other Latin American countries. We think that it is
important to acknowledge that public participation is much more
than simply a forum for spreading information or for holding dia-
logue. Indeed, such encounters are often highly political processes,
where the future of local territories and their inhabitants are up for
debate.
As a consequence, the first lesson to be learned is that we
should not just support claims for more and more comprehensive
participatory processes, as such processes might actually prove
more effective in convincing local populations to accept extraction
activities in their territories (especially when they are combined
with the use of questionable practices such as divide-and-rule tac-
tics). Therefore, we think that it is crucial to critically review thequality of participatory processes and to be particularly sensitive
to any manipulative undertakings therein. Raising awareness
about depoliticizing practices frequently applied in participatory
events could help to develop counterstrategies for dismantling
such disempowering techniques.
The second lesson relates to the controversial scholarly debates
about whether participation can reduce extraction-related con-
flicts or whether participation is more likely to exacerbate such
conflicts by providing political opportunities for mobilization and
contestation (see McAdam et al., 2010). The respective positions
(participation either as a driver or a tranquilizer of conflicts) were
sustained by referring to a few in-depth or comparative case stud-
ies. As our study has the advantage of covering a larger number of
cases (150 cases), our findings concerning the subnational varia-
tion of local contestation substantially contribute to this debate.
Our findings reveal that it is highly context-dependent whether
participation depoliticizes or repoliticizes with regard to extraction
activities. In line with several case studies (Bebbington et al., 2008;
Arellano-Yanguas, 2011; Conde, & Le Billon, 2017), we found that
local populations tended to contest hydrocarbon projects if they
had previous negative experiences with the extractive industries
or if local economic alternatives were well developed and per-
ceived to be threatened by planned extraction projects.
The third lesson concerns the effectiveness of state depoliticiz-
ing practices and the results of local contestation. In Peru the pro-
extraction agenda of PP was rather successful in the short run, as
participants’ opinions in many places became more extraction-
friendly. However, in places where local actors had already devel-
oped strong antiextraction attitudes, depoliticizing practices were
strongly contested and participants challenged the state’s policies
toward participation and resource extraction. Local contestation
was often quite influential, leading to increased social investment,
the withdrawal of corporations, and a law on the right to prior con-
sultation. We believe that the effectiveness of local contestation in
influencing the governance of natural resources is particularly
underresearched and should be at the center of future research
efforts. It would be important to use disaggregated concepts of
effectiveness or influence by distinguishing between discursive,
legal, political, economic, and ecological gains. In addition, the
effectiveness of local contestation should be traced over longer
time periods, as a temporary success might vanish over time. For
instance, with regard to the cases covered in this article, it would
be important to scrutinize whether local populations were able
to fend off undesired projects definitively or whether they just
secured delays to planned projects. Similarly, it will be crucial to
investigate whether the adoption of the Law on the Right to Prior
Consultation actually is helping affected populations to have their
concerns addressed. The prior consultation processes that have
been implemented in the past few years seem to reflect a similar
ambiguity in terms of the interplay between depoliticizing and
repoliticizing practices like the participatory events analyzed in
this article (Flemmer, forthcoming; Flemmer & Schilling-Vacaflor,
2016).
In conclusion, irrespective of the long-term success of extrac-
tion opposition, the instances of local contestation analyzed here
provide clear evidence of their (re)politicizing effects. These
dynamics contradict the insight that ‘‘environmental politics has
clearly metamorphosed from a highly political and politicizing ter-
rain into a largely depoliticized and post-political issue” (Blühdorn,
2014, p. 149). Rather, they shed light on the dysfunctionality of
postpolitics and its repeated failure to achieve the closure it desires
(Wilson, & Swyngedouw, 2014, pp. 300–301). Hence, the implica-
tions of this article’s findings are likely to go far beyond the stalling
of specific large-scale resource projects and might rather point to a
more fundamental crisis of current energy politics, which have
84 A. Schilling-Vacaflor et al. /World Development 108 (2018) 74–85largely been based on expanding the extractive frontiers in the
Global South.
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